A successful carbon capture and storage (CCS) policy and programme is widely considered essential to curbing carbon dioxide emissions. What explains the strikingly different policy outcomes in two key EU political heavyweights and coal economies, the UK and Germany?
Introduction
The EU sees carbon capture and storage (CCS) as essential for achieving its long-term decarbonization targets (European Commission 2013) . The goal of 12 demonstration plants in operation by 2015 was adopted in 2007, accompanied by policy initiatives -not least in the two key political heavyweights and coal economies, Germany and the UK. Both have positioned themselves as green frontrunners in the EU, and both are amongst the major EU countries (prior to Poland's accession) that rely most heavily on coal in their energy mix. CCS has been seen as necessary if coal is to continue to be used in the long run. This is coupled with high ambitions for decarbonization of the power sector in both countries.
The main policy decisions regarding material governmental support to CCS demonstration plants are strikingly different in Germany and the UK, which justifies choosing these cases for further investigation and a fruitful starting point for analysis of CCS policy. In Germany, politicians and industry have largely abandoned CCS; in the UK, there is political determination to bring two demonstration projects into operation by 2020, with specific financial support. We seek to explain the different policy outcomes by systematically comparing social dynamics and developments in these two countries whose outcomes matter considerably for EU climate-policy progress.
One difference concerns storage options: the UK has significantly higher potential for offshore storage of carbon dioxide (CO2). As offshore storage generally entails fewer user conflicts than onshore storage, CCS might be politically easier for the UK. Previous studies indicate differing political commitment to CCS in the two countries (Meadowcraft and Langhelle 2009 , Scrase and Watson 2009 , Praetorius and von Stechow 2009 , Jänicke 2011 , Rayner and Jordan 2011 , Hughes 2012 , Shackley and Evar 2012 , yet none compares developments in these two countries systematically and in-depth.
We find that the striking difference in policy outcomes is partly because the UK has a more favourable structural capacity and hence easier task than Germany. This includes differences in storage capacity and significant industry expertise, which has interacted with a solid political commitment to bring CCS forward in the UK, including specific, multi-stage funding, especially after 2009. In Germany CCS encountered increasing local and central opposition after 2009, with the energy sector transformation programme Energiewende, and renewables moving into the driver's seat.
Analytical framework
The ultimate evidence of CCS progress is concrete realization of CCS plants. As there currently are no fully developed demonstration plants in the UK or Germany, our dependent variable is governmental contracting of specific CCS projects with realization timelines.
Three main explanations can be offered for the presence or absence of specific governmental contracts. The first is based on basic national structural conditions and problem characteristics (Bailey et al. 2012) , which shape an easier or more difficult road to realizing CCS. The second explanation recognizes these conditions, but emphasizes how national dynamics have led to a further shaping of such differences. With structural conditions basically frozen, the main policy interest lies in the dynamic factors -political commitment to CCS. Whereas the first explanation is suited for exploring how embedded factors lead to bounded policy decisions, the second focuses on how these can be influenced by political decisions and what room exists for them (Bailey et al. 2012) . These two perspectives are unlikely to be fully isolated from each other, but represent analytically distinct and complementary accounts of climate-policy decisions. The third explanation highlights interaction with the EU.
Elaborating these three perspectives, the structural conditions explanation focuses on stable, slow-changing factors and fundamental conditions that can influence CCS realization.
Although the factors grouped under this headline are diverse, they are all stable or even static.
The distinction between factors that can be politically influenced and those that cannot is important for informing national policy, and is the main reason for such grouping of the variables.
First, a country with access to feasible offshore storage is likely to stand a better chance of developing low-conflict CCS projects than one with storage possibilities only onshore, entailing the likelihood of land-use conflicts. We measure offshore storage by analysing official estimates of storage potential and locations.
Second, a country already possessing relevant technological expertise, such as a petroleum exploration/extraction industry, is likely to provide more fertile ground for CCS than one without such expertise. This can be qualitatively assessed though interviews and economic activity.
Third, in a country with previous political conflicts over similar issues there is a greater risk that CCS may re-activate old conflict lines and resistance than in one with no such political conflicts (Fischedick 2009 ). This is difficult to establish objectively, but we asked interviewees to reflect on relevant potential or real issue linkages, leaving them to make connections. This approach involves minimal influence on interviewees, and enables comparisons of differences between the two cases.
Fourth, some elements of the national polity stand out as basically structural and not amenable to political 'manipulation'. A striking feature is the significant difference regarding the organization of the polity, including its degree of centralization: the German federal polity includes regional competence; the UK is a more unitary state. As the multi-level governance literature (Hooghe and Marks 2001, Bache and George 2004) The national dynamics perspective includes factors subject to 'political will'. Firstly we map and analyse the degree to which CCS has figured as a central theme on the agenda of important governmental agencies, qualitatively assessed on the basis of official documents and interviews. We expect that the degree to which specific organizational units and capacity have been established or dedicated to promote CCS will influence the ability to realize CCS projects. A further central factor is how national funding has developed -including the level of funding of CCS development and the main characteristics of relevant public-private partnerships. We measure national funding by mapping and comparing public financial support and relevant framework conditions, through official sources and interviews. Summing up, in line with the national dynamics explanation, we hypothesize that differences in specific governmental CCS contracting are due to one country devoting more agenda-related, organizational, and financial commitment to CCS than the other.
Finally, the third perspective highlights the role of the EU. We focus on three central Focusing on differing engagement with the funding mechanisms as a potential explanation, we hypothesize that differences in specific governmental CCS contracting are due to one country having a more active engagement with EU funding mechanisms than the other.
The explanatory factors are unlikely to work in isolation from each other, so our analysis will discuss interactions. For instance, access to offshore storage may have a 'double positive effect' -directly as storage opportunities, as well as a petroleum industry with experience relevant to CCS. Such natural conditions may in turn influence other factors, like public motivation for investing in CCS and administrative and political salience. We build on empirical data from formal documents (official budgets, national white and green papers, official reports, and press releases), as well as secondary sources, including interest organization/research reports.
To triangulate written sources and get under the surface of official policy, we conducted 14 semi-structured interviews. Interviewees were chosen on the basis of broad representation (official governmental representatives, interest organizations, industry partners and otherwise involved individuals), and approached by email, with follow-up. Most were specifically targeted, but some were identified through 'snowballing'. While a snowball approach can lead to empirical 'blind spots', our interviewees represented diverse actors, and with triangulation of sources no indications of substantial empirical gaps were found. All interviewees were asked specific questions about ambitions, political rhetoric, CCS-drive, effects and possible traps of policy choices, as well as encouraged to reflect freely about related issues, to allow new factors to be brought in. 
Pre-2005
CCS entered the research agenda in Germany in the late 1990s. Coal (particularly lignite) accounted for around half of electricity production, with renewables and 19 nuclear power plants accounting for around 7% and 30% respectively. Nuclear was at a standstill, as no new plants had come into operation since 1988. Natural gas accounted for the rest (13%) (Duffield and Westphal 2011) . Research and debate on CCS were coupled to heated earlier debate going back to the 1970s about transport and storage of nuclear wastes, and the planned nuclear reprocessing plant in Wackersdorf (Spiegel Online 2010b , 2010a . From the mid1990s, controversies increasingly focused on the transport of such waste.
There were significant 'Wall-fall' emissions-reduction effects when Germany became reunited (Hasselmeier and Wettestad 2000) . Ambitious emissions reduction goals were agreed: the EU target-sharing agreement adopted in 1998 obliged Germany to reduce its GHG emissions by 21% by 2008-2012, which made it necessary to explore climate-policy options.
The Social Democrats (SPD) won the 1998 elections and governed, in alliance with the Greens, until 2005. In 2000 this coalition adopted a comprehensive National Climate Protection Programme (Schafhausen 2002 , Wurzel et al. 2003 ) -with no mention of CCS.
Further development of renewable energy was a major element in the Programme, and this 'Energiewende' became an increasingly important factor shaping the German climate and energy debate. Merkel's CDU, mainly from representatives of constituencies where storage-site exploration was proposed. This withdrawal can be seen as a tactical move prior to upcoming elections in September, indicating that CCS was not seen as a 'winning cause' (Helseth 2011) . Our German interviewees agree that the postponement can be seen as a key turning point for CCS in Germany; thereafter, things became increasingly difficult. CCS was rapidly becoming a 'skunk issue' with which most politicians did not want to be associated.
At this stage the EU established its programme EEPR, which included co-funding six CCS demonstration projects. RWE and Vattenfall competed, and Vattenfall's Jänschwalde was awarded €180 million. Vattenfall also applied for the specific EU ETS funds, the NER 300 Fund. The application was later withdrawn -according to industry interviewees, in response to increasing turmoil over CCS.
In July 2010 a CCS compromise was proposed in the Bundestag. Now as a 'research law', it included a maximum storage limit of 3 Mton/year per storage site, a country-wide 8
Mton/year limit, and co-decision on storage sites for the German states. The Bundestag postponed debate on the law several times. Lack of local public acceptance was increasingly becoming a critical issue. In September the government announced national energy policy to 2050 with its Energy Concept plan. Here CCS technology was presented as offering attractive export opportunities for German industry, and the government endorsed 'the testing and where appropriate the use of CCS technology in Germany' (BMU 2010) . Based on the CCS Act, two demonstration projects were envisaged by 2020 (BMU 2010, pp.16-17) . By March 2011 the government had decided to phase out nuclear power within 10 years, stepping up the Energiewende and the turn to renewables (Beveridge and Kern 2013) .
The watered-down CCS Act was adopted by the Bundestag in July 2011. It effectively granted the Länder veto rights over CO2 storage within their borders, while also effectively excluding commercial use of CCS by limiting storage to 3 million tonnes per site. It was hardly coincidental that this corresponded to the planned annual volume of storage from All major industrial actors have now given up on CCS in Germany. In addition to the specific German dynamics, the financial crisis, the low European carbon price and insurance issues have undermined the business case for CCS for the foreseeable future (European Commission 2013). However, the Ketzin storage project is progressing as planned, is claimed to enjoy high acceptance, and is seen as the main German CCS project success storyalthough it is not commercialization, but rather a research project. The German fuel-mix for electricity production in 2012 was coal 45%, renewables 24%; nuclear 16%; biogas 9% and natural gas 6%. According to Haszeldine (2012, p.441) , the UK is 'uniquely well provided with CO2 storage potential' offshore. Storage can also provide synergies with traditional petroleum activities, and the UK is claimed to hold hundreds of years of storage for its own emissions, and possibly also for Europe (Senior CCS Solutions LTD 2010, p. 14 Instead, a Carbon Price Floor mechanism was introduced, adding a UK-specific carbon tax to British electricity generators to compensate for the low EU ETS allowance price. Parts of the revenues are to be used to support low-carbon technologies. The UK fuel-mix for electricity production in 2012 was 46% gas, 29% coal, 16% nuclear, and 16% renewables (IEA 2012) .
The use of coal for electricity generation is down significantly since 1990, from almost 70%, but the share of CO2-emitting generation has remained high.
The Climate Change Act also prepared the ground for the Energy Market Reform (EMR), proposed in 2010, with significant potential for low-carbon structural change. An important CCS-relevant element of the reform is the 'Contracts for Difference' scheme (CfD), an adjustable feed-in premium system scheduled to start in 2017. Supported technologies (including CCS) will sell electricity and heat in the market, and CfD will cover the difference between the estimated market price and the long-term price needed to promote investments in a given technology -the 'Strike Price' (DECC 2012c (DECC , 2012b . in a large number of projects, mainly basic research but also some on the applied and pilot levels (DECC 2013a). All this is indicative of the consistent political commitment of both Labour and the Conservative parties to CCS (Geels 2014) .
Explaining differing CCS outcomes: interplay of structural and dynamic factors
Both Germany and the UK have struggled to bring CCS forward, with the result that in 2015, the main deadline in official EU policy, neither has a full-scale demonstration plant in operation. Yet the UK has announced support for two demonstration projects -and Germany none. Why?
Different national structural conditions?
Our hypothesis was that differences in specific CCS contracting are caused by one country having a more favourable structural starting point than the other, in terms of natural, technological and political characteristics. We found some support for this. Clearly, Germany and the UK have had very different CCS-relevant initial conditions as regards relatively static factors like natural endowments. Access to CO2 storage is the most striking structural difference, UK access to large offshore areas with good storage capacity contrasting with Germany's opportunities mainly limited to land-based storage, which has proven neither politically nor practically easy.
This basic difference is important, as it tends to interact with and lead to several other issues and differences further along the causal chain. The existence of offshore oil and gas fields -the reason for the UK's large storage potential -also explains why an interested and competent petroleum industry is present on the national scene. Large companies like BP and Shell have been proactive in pushing CCS in the UK, whereas in Germany the number of planned and initiated projects has been moderate, and the petroleum industry has a much more limited presence.
Another striking difference lies in fundamental political/administrative structures.
Compared to the UK's relatively centralised and unitary government, the German federal system entails various obstacles to CCS development. Concerned about environmental issues, several key Länder have been restrictive, as seen in the development of the German CCS law, with strict volume limitations to storage, which have been significant impediments to the realization of full-scale CCS plants.
Different national dynamics?
We hypothesized that differences in specific governmental CCS contracting are due to one country devoting more agenda-related, organizational, and financial commitment to CCS than the other. There are clear differences in how CCS has been framed and placed in the public debate. In Germany we find a stricter 'green' focus, with CCS seen by central governmental and non-governmental actors as merely contributing to 'business as usual', instead of underpinning the preferred and 'real green' Energiewende, with its major focus on renewables. The narrow 'green' focus is further indicated by the near-absence of environmental NGOs that accept CCS as a viable solution, a striking difference with the UK, where attitudes to transformation to a low-emissions energy sector have been more pragmatic, and CCS is an accepted technology at elite level, with the general public less informed but offering little opposition. In Germany, CCS has become associated with earlier controversies related to transport and underground storage of nuclear waste, which has tainted CCS technology's reputation, leading to low political feasibility; no larger NGOs or political parties express strong support for CCS. Furthermore, the CCA contributed to the establishment of DECC and the subsidiary specific office for CCS (OCCS). Opinion differs as to how well coordinated UK CCS policy has really been, but the establishment of OCSS has put the responsibility on the organizational map. Germany lacks a similar office or organizational node for CCS. Generally, the UK governmental apparatus seems more united in its perceptions of CCS than is the case in Germany, where there is a major split in and between the relevant ministries.
Differences in national CCS target-setting are another factor. The UK CCS Roadmap states the goal of a viable commercial CCS industry by the end of the 2020s. This has slipped slightly, with a delay from the early to late 2020s, but the goal is clearly expressed, and measures have been enacted to achieve it. Germany, by contrast, has had more diffusely stated official ambitions regarding CCS, with 'demonstration plants' to be realized by 2020.
The specific instruments have been weaker in Germany, and there are substantial differences in funding for research on CCS. Both major research programmes in Germany have included governmental funding, but they pale in comparison with Britain's. The UK programme of £125 million has funded most British CCS-relevant research and, ranging from basic research to concrete applied-science test projects on the verge of commercialization, has contributed to developing CCS and possible commercialization.
The differences are even starker as regards funding support for commercialization.
Whereas Germany has not yet developed a concrete commercialization scheme, the UK has put in place £1bn, with goals for the industry to be commercially functioning by the mid2020s. While final realization of the UK funding for commercialization is pending, the White Rose and Peterhead projects are well-positioned: FEED contracts have been signed, and the projects are currently being developed.
We find relevant differences also in other political framework conditions for CCS phase-in, especially for energy market structuring. Germany has a more open tradition and is less reluctant to support specific technologies. However, it has not yet developed specific conditions for facilitating the phase-in of CCS into the German energy system to improve the business case. The UK, although generally favouring a more narrow and 'technology-blind' approach (Mitchell 2010) , has made important changes that influence the CCS business case; the changed support scheme with CfD contributes to realization of specific CCS projects.
Leadership by politicians to guide their publics towards acceptance of CCS has been more vigorous in the UK than in Germany. In Germany, CCS has become a complicated, burdensome issue from which politicians have increasingly sought to distance themselves.
Knowledge about CCS among the public may be quite low in both countries and fundamental hostility towards the technology may not be much greater in Germany, but the room for organized opposition and mobilization has been allowed to develop more freely in Germany, with no supporting NGOs, high public resistance, and little political backing. Our evidence shows that politicians have more actively championed CCS technology in the UK than in Germany, the two largest political parties supporting it continuously by similar explicit goal statements as well as economic support schemes and regulations.
Different engagement with the EU?
We hypothesized that differences in specific governmental CCS contracting are due to one country having a more active engagement with EU funding mechanisms than the other. Does bringing in EU-level factors significantly enhance our understanding of the differences between the two countries? Not very much, although they are not totally irrelevant. First and foremost, EU factors can help to explain why CCS project activity in both countries increased considerably from 2005 onwards, and why the business case for CCS has deteriorated over time, in line with ETS problems and the low carbon price. But EU-level CCS funding has played a somewhat more important part in CCS politics in the UK than in Germany, and the effect of an overall low carbon price has been less detrimental for CCS dynamics in the UK than Germany due to the introduction of the British Carbon Price Floor. Table 1 sums up the key comparative differences. 
Conclusions
Structural and stable factors like storage options, presence of relevant industry, status of coal industry and polity structure all emerge as important factors that influence the likelihood of realizing carbon capture and storage. As seen in Germany, when many unfavourable structural conditions are present, they can interact in ways that amplify the obstacles to developing commercially viable CCS. Moreover, the room for more dynamic factors that influence CCS -funding, national attitudes, administrative dedication and high-level political support -is shaped by structural conditions. In Germany, difficulties in storage options, coupled with heavy political influence from the Länder and issue-linkage to nuclear waste, have meant low commitment to CCS, whereas the UK has significant offshore storage potential and fewer complicating linkages to previous and controversial environmental issues such as nuclear storage. Furthermore, the relatively unitary polity structure of the UK favours national efforts, unlike Germany's complicated de-centralized and veto-based decision structure.
The UK has emplaced more significant policy measures for developing CCS, and political leadership on CCS matters has been more apparent and stronger than in Germany.
Elite British politicians and bureaucrats have embraced the issue, in rhetoric and in practice; more funding has been allocated to research and specific project development, resulting in an active public-private partnership. In Germany, by contrast, leadership basically evaporated together with the reputation of CCS; both among the public at large and politicians it became a 'skunk issue' and an 'election loser'.
Initial differences in structural conditions do matter for the likelihood of developing CCS. However, these structural conditions are not necessarily the sole explanation for lack of progress -storage issues, for example, are in principle solvable. There appears to have been substantially stronger political will in the UK to take CCS technology forward, which, interacting with more favourable conditions, has contributed to a different outcome from that in Germany. Thus we conclude that while structural conditions establish the broader framework and room for politics to unfold, ultimate realization of CCS depends on political will.
